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Abstract
Truth commissions and trials have been applauded as the way to move on from a violent past. 
Yet, some post-conflict societies managed to move toward reconciliation without the presence, 
or the effective presence of such formal institutions. This article discusses a number of lessons 
learned from Maluku, where reconciliation took the interdependence path. Taking on an 
interpretive, emic approach, it elaborates on the sites and mechanisms of interdependence. It 
argues that interdependence can be as viable as truth and justice procedures in bringing about 
reconciliation.
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Abstrak
Menurut literatur, rekonsiliasi hanya akan berhasil jika ada komisi kebenaran dan pengadilan ad hoc. 
Kenyataannya, beberapa masyarakat pasca konflik mampu menjalani proses rekonsiliasi tanpa kedua 
institusi formal tersebut. Tulisan ini mengangkat kasus Maluku, di mana rekonsiliasi ditempuh melalui 
jalur interdependensi. Berangkat dari pendekatan interpretivis dan emik, tulisan ini mendiskusikan situs 
dan mekanisme interdependensi. Tulisan ini berargumen bahwa jalur interdependensi bisa mengantarkan 
masyarakat pasca konflik menuju rekonsiliasi, layaknya jalur kebenaran dan keadilan.
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Introduction
Truth commissions and trials have been 
applauded as the way to move on from a violent 
past. Accordingly, post-conflict experiences 
lacking these formal procedures are usually 
treated as cases in which no reconciliation 
takes place – wherein the troublesome past 
is dealt through forgetting and pardoning, 
resulting in a collective amnesia and a culture 
of impunity. Otherwise, they are treated as 
cases in which reconciliation takes place in 
a suboptimal manner, thus likely to impose 
serious challenges to democracy and long-term 
peace.1
I wish to take a different position. I 
contend that, under certain circumstances, 
post-conflict societies can indeed move toward 
reconciliation without the presence, or the 
effective presence, of truth commissions 
or trials. One exemplary case is Maluku, 
Indonesia, where reconciliation takes a distinct 
1 See Hayner (2002), Avruch (2010), Braithwaite, et.al. 
(2010), Popovski and Serrano (2012), and van Klinken 
(2014).
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depth interviews, and focus group discussions,4 
I looked into “everyday reconciliation” in 
Maluku. In doing so, I gained insights to 
reconciliation as vernacular practices, as it is 
understood and experienced on a day-to-day 
basis by people in Maluku. These insights 
would have been entirely overlooked by 
studies that narrowly associate reconciliation 
with formal truth and justice procedures.5
This article presents some lessons learned 
from reconciliation processes in Maluku. It 
starts off with a snippet of the Maluku case and 
what reconciliation means to Malukans. Then, 
it discusses the four sites where it is exercised: 
ceremonial, neighborhood, functional-
quotidian, and narrative. Subsequently, it 
teases out the three mechanisms that underpin 
it: emphasis on social roles over religious 
affiliations, display of remorse and forgiveness, 
and creation of focal points for peace – proving 
that interdependence is indeed a viable path to 
reconciliation. While its adoption may indicate 
some reluctance to take on the truth and/
or justice paths to reconciliation, I maintain 
that interdependence, at least in the case of 
Maluku, does not abandon truth and justice 
altogether. In this very case, truth is pursued 
in a limited manner, for the specific purpose 
of trust building, whereas justice is pursued 
in a future-oriented manner, for the specific 
purpose of conflict prevention.
Reconciliation in Maluku
January 1999 saw the beginning of violent 
communal clashes between Christians and 
Muslims in Maluku.6 Over 2,000 incidents of 
4 In addition to conducting 57 in-depth interviews and 
seven focus group discussions, I studied interview 
transcripts from Ambon Database Pilot Study (n=160) 
and Ambon Database (n=240).
5 Some notable studies that break away from tradition 
and highlight local pursuits of truth and justice are those 
of by Heonik Kwon (2006), Birgit Braeuchler (2009), and 
Alexander Laban Hinton (2010).
6 In this paper, the term “Christian” denotes followers of 
the Protestant faith, and is selected over “Protestant” 
path: interdependence. By interdependence, I 
refer to the path to reconciliation that John 
Paul Lederach (1997), Johan Galtung (2001), 
and contributors to Antonia Chayes and 
Martha Minow’s (2003) edited volume refer 
to as peace, joint reconstruction, and coexistence, 
respectively. The literature suggests that this 
path to reconciliation is anchored in the notion 
that former enemies have a common, connected 
future (Lederach, 1997: 29), is motivated by 
pragmatic needs rather than moral imperatives 
(Gardner Feldman, 1999), is less costly than 
resolving conflicts through formal (legal) 
procedures (Smith, 1989: 386), makes it too 
costly “both in political and human terms, for 
conflict to be carried out by violent means” 
(Ackermann, 1994: 245), and is essentially a 
series of narrative shifts from “since we are 
enemies, hostility is the only option” to “since 
we are one and we need each other, hostility 
would definitively be foolish” (Sluzki, 2010: 
59-62)2.
As any other phenomenon, reconciliation 
carries different meanings to different people. 
Believing that a good study of reconciliation 
needs to cogitate these meanings seriously, my 
qualitative study takes on an interpretive, emic3 
approach. Through participant observation, in-
2 Carlos Sluzki (2010: 59-62) talks of interdependence 
as one of the six stages between open conflict and 
reconciliation. The stages and the dominant narrative 
surrounding each are (1) confrontation – “hostility is 
the only option”, (2) truce – “we are ready for hostile 
acts when needed”, (3) collaboration – “hostilities are 
a fall back option”, (4) cooperation – “hostilities would 
be a major disadvantage”, (5) interdependence – “we 
need each other, hostility would definitely be foolish”, 
and (6) integration – “we are one.”
3 When taking an emic (instead of an etic) approach, a 
researcher tries to understand a phenomenon through 
the viewpoints of the research subjects. Here, prior 
theories and assumptions are put aside to allow 
participants and data to “speak for themselves” and 
to let themes, patterns, and concepts emerge. For 
further discussions on emic and etic perspectives, see 
Headland, Pike, and Harris (1990), Willis (2007), Yin 
(2010), and http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keywo
rd=qualitative&pageid=icb.page340911 
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communal violence were recorded between 
January 13, 1999 and February 13, 2002 (Barron, 
Azca, & Susdinarjanti, 2012: 12), the day 
representatives of both parties signed a truce 
known as the Malino II Declaration. The conflict 
led to spatial segregation of Christians and 
Muslims, which, in nearly all villages, members 
of the minority faith group were forced to flee. 
It also led to a severe disruption of freedom of 
movement, where Christians were confined in 
Christian quarters and Muslims were confined 
in Muslim quarters. It claimed over 6,000 lives, 
with more than 7,000 people injured, and 
nearly 29,000 buildings destroyed (ibid.), as 
well as caused the displacement of over 500,000 
people (ICG, 2000). Additionally, 39 incidents 
of communal violence took place after Malino 
II, altogether claiming the lives of 367 people 
(ibid.). Most of them happened shortly after the 
signing of the truce, but the most notable were 
those of 2004 and 2011.7
In Maluku, efforts toward reconciliation 
relied neither on truth commissions nor trials. 
Although a fact finding mission was launched 
by the Indonesian National Commission on 
Human Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi 
Manusia – Komnas HAM),8 its report only 
glosses over some general information that 
have nevertheless been publically known and 
is not in any way a full record of the various 
narratives surrounding the Maluku conflict. 
Although over 850 arrests were made by 2000, 
trials could not be held because personnel of the 
to remain close to the vernaculars in Maluku, where 
Protestants are referred to as “Kristen” and Catholics 
as “Katolik.” Most Protestants in Maluku are followers 
of Gereja Protestan Maluku (GPM – Maluku Protestant 
Church). Traditionally part of the Dutch Reformed 
Church, GPM adheres to Calvinism.
7 For more details on the causes and dynamics of 
the Maluku conflict, see Adam (2009; 2010), Azca 
(2006), Bartels (2003), Braithwaite and Dunn (2010), 
Panggabean (2004; 2014a; 2015), Sidel (2008), and van 
Klinken (2001; 2007).
8 On January 14, 2000, Komnas HAM formed a Commission 
for Human Rights Violation Investigation and Mediation 
in Maluku (Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi 
Manusia dan Mediasi di Maluku).
legal system had fled and prisons had broken 
down (Braithwaite & Dunn, 2010: 158-159). 
Even after the legal system was restored, trials 
of several leaders of Christian and Muslim 
organizations were held in regular criminal 
courts, not in special human rights trials. 
Moreover, such processes were not extended to 
ordinary citizens despite their involvement in 
the violent events. In other words, the processes 
of healing and “moving forward” were neither 
based on truth nor justice; there are neither 
official accounts of “who did what to whom, 
where, when, and how” nor official decisions 
on “who pays what to whom, where, when, 
and how.9“
Keeping in mind that the literature10 
champions formal truth -and justice- seeking 
procedures, it is easy to dismiss Maluku as a 
case in which reconciliation did not take place 
or did take place in a suboptimal manner.11 
However, a careful look into the dynamics of 
Christian-Muslim relations in post-conflict 
Maluku revealed that Malukans – both at the 
elite and grassroots level – do meaningfully 
engage in reconciliation processes, through the 
interdependence path.
Building upon Lily Gardner Feldman’s 
(1999) notion that interdependence is motivated 
by pragmatic, rather than moral, imperatives, 
I specify that one strong driving force for 
9 I use this phrase to cover a wide range of justice 
procedures, including, but not limited to, paying 
compensation, serving time in prison, and being banned 
from certain privileges.
10 For general reading on reconciliation and transitional 
justice, see Avruch (2010), Chapman (2009), Daly and 
Sarkin (2007), Dancy, Kim, and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 
(2010), Galtung (2005), Kymlicka and Bashir (2008), 
Lederach (1997), Licklider and Bloom (2007), Long and 
Brecke (2003), Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010), Popovski 
and Serrano (2012), Pouligny, Simon, and Schnabel 
(2007) and Staub (2006).
11 Skepticism about “non-truth” and “non-justice” 
post-conflict arrangements in Indonesia can be found 
in Braithwaite, et.al. (2010) and van Klinken (2014). 
Meanwhile, those who are optimistic, despite the lack 
of truth- and justice- seeking procedures in Maluku, 
include Ali-Fauzi (2013) and Panggabean (2014b).
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interdependence is the need to restore 
“normalcy.12” Throughout my research, I 
came across ample narratives on the urgency of 
restoring the systems distorted by the Maluku 
conflict: health, education, transportation, 
sanitation, agriculture, fishery, security, 
governance, and communication systems, to 
name a few. Mothers insisted that children – 
child-soldiers included – should be able to return 
to school, customers demanded unrestricted 
access to all traditional markets and all shops 
within and beyond the segregation lines, traders 
stressed the importance of reopening their 
supply lines and of reestablishing clienteles 
from both the Christian and Muslim sides, 
drivers of public transportation were eager to 
reopen cross-village routes, workers needed 
the banks to run again to withdraw their 
monthly salary, doctors emphasized that both 
communities should have access to all medical 
facilities, religious leaders saw it important that 
churches and mosques return to their function 
as places of worship and not be used as war-
mobilization centers, youths were restless 
about not having enough music and sporting 
events they could attend to, and so on. They 
were adamant about recovering “life before the 
1999 clash” and the motive for this goes beyond 
moral imperatives of living harmoniously; it 
is mainly grounded in practical needs to go 
on with a decent life. They understood that 
ending spatial segregation and reinstating 
freedom of movement is central to restoring 
such systems which they are contingent upon 
for reestablishing and sustaining Christian-
Muslim cooperation.
Attempts to initiate the above activities 
capitalized on pre-conflict intergroup 
camaraderie among friends, relatives, neighbors, 
colleagues, and classmates. They started with 
a few Christians, or Muslims, reaching out 
to members of the other faith group whom 
12 I am aware that the term “normalcy” is loaded and has 
contested meanings – hence the quotation marks.
they have developed rapport with before 1999 
to jointly facilitate perjumpaan (encounters). 
Over time, the encounters expanded in terms 
of frequency, intensity, and the number of 
people involved. Sustained by superordinate 
goals (Sherif, 1958) to restore normalcy and 
consistent to the contact hypothesis (Allport, 
1954) and intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew, 
1998), they generated space for deconstructing 
stereotypes, checking rumors, learning other 
“versions” of past events, etc., as well as for 
developing realistic empathy (White, 1984) 
among Christians and Muslims.13
From an emic viewpoint, it is clear that 
the numerous Christian-Muslim activities to 
restore normalcy are parts of reconciliation 
processes: they are conscious and voluntary 
acts that mark a departure from the violent 
past and signify restored relationships with 
“the other side.” What is interesting is that 
Malukans themselves were not so keen on the 
term rekonsiliasi.14 When asked “what does 
rekonsiliasi mean to you?” almost no respondents 
provided straightforward “definitions.” I found 
at least four groups of answer to the question, 
each pointing at resentment, prerequisites, 
indicators, or procedures of reconciliation. 
The first one, amply found in early 
2000s, reflects “no rekonsiliasi” attitudes. 
It underlines the deep resentments that 
Malukans had against the term rekonsiliasi, as 
it invokes the idea of turning one’s head away 
from the atrocious past, of not taking issues 
with the wrongdoings of the other group, of 
betraying one’s own group. Here, the narratives 
surrounding rekonsiliasi include “How can you 
expect us to reconcile with those who have 
killed our family members?” “Reconciliation 
means letting them get away with what 
13 Bringing in theories on social capital and communal 
conflicts, it is plausible to say that while bridging civic 
associations (Putnam, 2000; Varshney, 2002) seem to have 
failed to prevent the Malukan communal conflict, they 
play a crucial role in fostering reconciliation through 
the interdependence path.
14 This is the Indonesian term for “reconciliation.”
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they did!” and “If we reconcile with them, it 
means we are betraying our deceased family 
members and our religion.” Individuals who 
reached out to “the other” were indeed labeled 
as Judas, sell-outs, traitors, converts, spies, 
human-headed snakes, apostates, and halal 
darahnya (someone whose blood is considered 
permissible by Islamic law to be spilled). 
The second group represents the 
“rekonsiliasi, but only if” attitudes, mostly 
found in the months and years following the 
2002 Malino II Conference. Here, Malukans 
had become more open to the term and idea 
of rekonsiliasi. They no longer see rekonsiliasi 
as unthinkable, but as contingent upon the 
fulfillment of a number of prerequisites, mostly 
genuine apologies from perpetrators to victims. 
Unfortunately, both Christians and Muslims 
at this point were convinced that culpability 
lies entirely on the other side, that they were 
purely victims, and that their participation in 
violence was merely self-defense. As stated 
by a Muslim respondent, “I think, in order to 
achieve peace, Christians should admit that 
they indeed planned the conflict and should 
apologize to Muslims.” Mirror perceptions 
were found among the Christians as well.
The third group consists of the “rekonsiliasi 
is when” responses, which marks what 
Malukans think the indicators of a reconciled 
society should be. An overwhelming majority 
underlined that rekonsiliasi is achieved when 
Christians and Muslims are back to living 
the basudara15 ethics. Others expressed that 
rekonsiliasi occurs when all displaced Christians 
and Muslims can return to their village, or 
when people no longer have desire for revenge. 
This emphasis on indicators signify a departure 
from perceiving rekonsiliasi as contingent upon 
apologies from the other faith group. This third 
group of responses, along with that of the 
15 Malukans believe that they, regardless of religious, 
ethnic, and class affiliations, are basudara – that is, the 
bond as “siblings.” The basudara ethics has been passed 
on through generations over the centuries. 
fourth, dominates the narratives on rekonsiliasi 
in the late 2000s and onwards.
The fourth group is comprised of 
“rekonsiliasi through” responses, suggesting 
the ways rekonsiliasi should be pursued. 
Here, most respondents underlined that 
rekonsiliasi should be organik – that is, generated 
genuinely among Christians and Muslims at 
the grassroots level, not imposed by the state 
or Christian/Muslim elites. More specifically, 
some respondents mentioned that at the 
grassroots level, rekonsiliasi can be nurtured 
through peace economy, collective labor (gotong 
royong), sports, music, and exchange activities. 
Two statements from Rev. Jacky Manuputty, 
one of the main peace activists in Maluku, 
fall into this category. First, he mentioned that 
rekonsiliasi is like weaving a colorful straw mat 
(menganyam tikar pandan) done by interlocking 
differently colored straws in such a way that 
they hold and support each other. Second, he 
mentioned that rekonsiliasi work is like eating 
hot porridge, where one should start from 
the sides of the bowl, one scoop at a time. To 
him, rekonsiliasi is about bringing together the 
various Christian and Muslim networks to 
initially discuss and work on “mundane” day-
to-day issues and only then gradually engage 
them in more “sensitive” issues (Manuputty, 
Interview, January 2014).
It is crucial to underline that all of the above 
respondents participated in interdependence-
based activities. In other words, even those 
who explicitly said that they would not 
reconcile with the other, as it means betraying 
their family and friends, or as it needs to be 
preceded by apologies from perpetrators, take 
part in various Christian-Muslim activities to 
restore normalcy. Positivistic approaches to the 
study of reconciliation are likely to take at face 
value the statements that Malukans rejected 
rekonsiliasi. Meanwhile, an emic approach calls 
for a more thorough examination. It encourages 
researchers to look at the meanings, symbolism, 
and performativity surrounding Christian-
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Muslim collaborations. It sheds light on actual 
reconciliation practices that were concealed by 
anti-rekonsiliasi statements.
The temporal variation of what rekonsiliasi 
means in Maluku sheds light on when and 
why Malukans started to embark upon (the 
interdependence path of) reconciliation. In 
a separate piece, I argue that the reasons for 
this pertain to (1) the adoption of provokator 
narratives – in which Malukans shift the 
ultimate blame from “the other faith group” 
to an “elusive, unidentifiable third party”, (2) 
the idea that everyone is complicit – wherein 
Malukans accept that everyone, including 
themselves and their coreligionists, is guilty, 
be it by commission or omission, and (3) vivid 
memories of peace – wherein memories of 
harmonious Christian-Muslim relations over 
the centuries, of being basudara, overcomes 
memories of violence.16 What is more relevant 
to this article is to notice the shift from subjects 
tying up rekonsiliasi with notions of truth and 
justice (as in the first and second group of 
responses) to narrating rekonsiliasi as practices 
of interdependence (as in the third and fourth 
group of responses) – of which the next section 
delves into.
Interdependence and Its Four Sites
Upon thorough observation of the 
various perjumpaan and Muslim-Christian 
collaborations, I identified four sites in 
which interdependence occurs: ceremonial, 
neighborhood, functional-quotidian, and 
narrative.17
16 It is elaborated in my doctoral dissertation (2015), 
why and how Malukans managed to embark upon 
interdependence – thus affording to bypass truth- and 
justice- seeking paths of reconciliation. In this paper, I 
focus on the “how” and merely state the “why.”
17 These sites should not be seen as being mutually 
exclusive. Meetings of adat leaders, for example, 
are located at the ceremonial, neighborhood, and 
functional-quotidian sites altogether. Similarly, 
Christian-Muslim music collaborations are part of 
interdependence-based activities at both the functional-
quotidian and narrative sites.
Ceremonial site. Activities at the 
ceremonial site brought together those who are 
perceived as influential and as representations 
of certain groups within the society. The 
Search Conference for Maluku18 (March 2000), 
the series of BakuBae workshops19 (August-
December 2000), and the Malino II Conference20 
(February 2002) fall under this category, as 
they aimed at facilitating dialogues among 
prominent religious and community leaders 
of Maluku.
The initial hours, sessions, or days of the 
meetings went by with participants faulting the 
members of the other faith group for having 
incited communal violence. Convinced of 
their side’s victimhood, as well as of the other 
side’s malice, participants strongly refused to 
“make peace with the other.” Nevertheless, 
they understood that in order to move towards 
normalcy they needed to mutually resolve 
a number of issues. These include IDPs, 
health, education, media, trauma healing, 
infrastructure, radicalization, security, and 
governance issues – all of which are dependent 
upon actions that ends the violence and 
reestablishes freedom of movement. Here, both 
18 This was the first meeting to bring together representatives 
of the Christian and Muslim communities since the 
outbreak of the Maluku conflict. It was attended by 
more than 50 participants and was jointly organized 
by The British Council and the Center for Security 
and Peace Studies of Gadjah Mada University (CSPS-
UGM). For security reasons and to enable more relaxed 
Christian-Muslim exchanges, the conference was 
held outside of Maluku, namely Bali, where the local 
population is predominantly Hindu. For details, see 
Hadar (2000).
19 BakuBae started off with three workshops: August 
2000 in Jakarta, October 2000 in Bali, and December 
2000 in Yogyakarta. Its other activities include polling, 
facilitating profession/occupation-based meetings, 
campaigns, as well as audiences with leaders of formal 
religious and state institutions. For details, see Malik 
(2003).
20 Sponsored by the Coordinating Minister for Economic 
and Industrial Affairs, Jusuf Kalla, Malino II Conference 
had the highest profile of all Christian-Muslim meetings. 
The conference was held on February 11-12, 2002, but 
was preceded by several exploratory consultations. For 
details, see Ernas (2006).
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sides made it clear to each other that what they 
aimed for was merely the cessation of violence, 
not peace nor reconciliation. This is consistent 
to the dominant view in early 2000s that while 
restoring normalcy is necessary, rekonsiliasi with 
the “other” means betrayal.
Neighborhood site. As indicated earlier, 
communal clashes had led to the displacement 
of approximately half a million people in 
Maluku (ICG, 2000). Many Christians had 
to flee from predominantly Muslim villages; 
many Muslims had to flee from predominantly 
Christian villages; many Christians and 
Muslims had to flee from mixed villages.21 
Accordingly, a huge portion of restoring 
normalcy at the neighborhood site included 
facilitating the return of IDPs, reconstruction 
of buildings, and fostering good intergroup 
relations among neighbors. These activities 
brought together Christians and Muslims 
who live, or used to live, in the same village, 
as well as those who are bound by pela and/or 
gandong.22
In Wayame, a mixed village that remained 
intact throughout the Maluku conflict,23 
Christians and Muslims formed Tim 20,24 
which tasks included checking rumors and 
performing “in-group policing.25” In Nania, 
21 For more information on displacement in Maluku, see 
reports from the Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre (2011) and Jesuit Refugee Services (2006; 
2013).
22 Pela and gandong are part of adat (ethnic-based 
customary rules). Pela refers to intervillage alliances, 
while gandong refers to originating from the same line of 
ancestors. Given the intricate pela and gandong relations, 
it is very likely that most Malukan Christians are pela- or 
gandong- related to at least one Malukan Muslim, and 
vice versa. For a detailed explanation on pela, see Bartels 
(1985).
23 Another mixed village in Maluku that remained intact 
throughout the conflict is Waraka (see Herin 2014).
24 For more detailed illustration on Tim 20, see Al Qurtuby 
(2013) and Pariela (2008).
25 I adopt the term “in-group policing” from James 
Fearon and David Laitin’s (1996) study on interethnic 
cooperation. Here, Christian members of Tim 20 would 
punish Christian residents of Wayame taking part in 
violent acts, and Muslims member of Tim 20 would 
Poka, and Rumah Tiga, Christians and Muslims 
extended security guarantees to each other, 
allowing for residents who had fled to return. 
On top of promising not to hurt each other, 
Christian residents pledged to protect their 
Muslim neighbors should Christian militias 
attack the village and Muslim residents pledged 
to protect their Christian neighbors in the event 
of attacks by Muslim militias. Additionally, 
both sides enthusiastically participated in 
collective labor to rebuild houses, churches, 
mosques, and other infrastructures destroyed 
during the conflict. Meanwhile, in many 
other villages, the processes of return and 
reconstruction were supported by the village’s 
pela or gandong partner. In the predominantly 
Christian village of Waai, for example, residents 
received assistance, mostly in the form of labor, 
from their pela partner, the predominantly 
Muslim village of Morella.26 
Functional-quotidian site. Apart 
from deaths, displacements, and physical 
damages, one major consequence of the 
communal violence in Maluku was strict spatial 
segregation, where freedom of movement was 
severely disrupted, meaning that Christians 
were confined in Christian quarters, Muslims 
in Muslim ones. This means that all public 
services as well as daily social economic 
activities became distorted. In the trade sector, 
spatial segregation “locked in” resources in 
Christian or Muslim areas – for example, fish, 
punish Muslim residents of Wayame taking part in 
violent acts.
26 Other examples include the reconstruction of places of 
worship in the predominantly Muslim village of Batu 
Merah, the predominantly Muslim village of Kailolo, 
and the predominantly Christian village of Tuhaha, 
which were assisted by each village’s pela partner, 
respectively, the predominantly Christian village of 
Passo, the predominantly Christian village of Tihulale, 
and the predominantly Muslim village of Rohomoni. 
Other adat activities include panas pela, makan patita, 
vehe belan, and village-cleansing ceremonies. Braeuchler 
(2009c) and Laksono and Topatimasang (2003) provide 
detailed case studies on adat’s role in reconciliation. 
Aladjai’s (2013) novel also offers illustration on adat 
and reconciliation.
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vegetables, and rice (barang pasar) were only 
available in Muslim areas, whereas flour, sugar, 
cooking oil, and baby formula (barang toko) 
were only available in Christian areas. Money, 
too, was scarce in Muslim areas, given that 
all banks were located in Christian quarters. 
Christian children whose schools were located 
in Muslim quarters and Muslim children whose 
schools were located in Christian quarters lost 
access to education. Many people lost access 
to healthcare, as the nearest hospital, clinic, 
or doctor practice were located at a quarter 
“belonging” to the other faith group. Many lost 
their jobs as they could not trespass Christian-
Muslim borders to get to where they were 
supposed to go; drivers of public transportation 
could not carry on with their usual inter village 
routes; journalists could only collect news in 
Christian or Muslim quarters,27 and so on. 
Activities at the functional-quotidian 
site aim at restoring the above conditions 
through utilizing the specific training, skills, 
occupation, and networks attached to groups 
of colleagues or peers. A group of health 
workers built health centers at Christian-
Muslim borders. Christian and Muslim traders 
met at border areas to exchange scarce goods. 
Minibus drivers paired-up and took turns – the 
Christian driver would be behind the wheel 
when passing by Christian villages, and vice 
versa. Journalists committed themselves to 
peace journalism and established Maluku 
Media Center, where they exchanged reports 
from Christian and Muslim quarters. Priests 
and ulamas organized interfaith dialogues, 
peace sermons, and “live-in” programs (where 
Christians spend some nights with a Muslim 
family and vice versa).28 Christian and Muslim 
mothers and women banded together to take 
27 For more details on how the Maluku conflict affected 
the media, see Eriyanto (2003).
28 For more examples of religious peace building, see 
Sandyarani (2014), Manuputty (2011), Wakano (2014), 
Toisuta (2014), Hendriks (2014), and Al Qurtuby 
(2013).
back their children from militias, to secure 
scholarships to keep children in school, to 
organize various trauma healing activities, 
to kick-start income-generating activities, 
and so on.29 Youths came up with rumor-
checking mechanisms, organized music, sports, 
arts, blogging, travelling, photography and 
other events, provided emergency education 
programs in IDP camps, and so on.30 These 
are only a few examples of the many activities 
undertaken in the functional-quotidian site.31 
It should be noted that many of the Christian-
Muslim collaborations in this site were initiated 
in order to restore normalcy and only later on 
were modified to foster reconciliation. 
 Narrative site. More than a decade 
after the Maluku conflict, a number of movies, 
books, songs, and poems offer interpretations 
of the conflict and reconciliation processes in 
Maluku. One example is Cahaya Dari Timur: Beta 
Maluku, a movie about how football facilitated 
Christian-Muslim collaborations, which won 
the best picture at the 2015 Indonesian Film 
Festival. Irfan Ramly, the young Ambonese 
who wrote the screenplay, said that although 
the movie project was initially built around 
Sani Tawainella’s life story, the characters 
and dialogues were redesigned in a way that 
incorporates the viewpoints of many Malukans 
regarding the conflict and reconciliation. “It 
underlines what everyone thinks and aspires, 
that is, to live peacefully and to live better” 
(Ramly, Interview, January 2015).
Other notable examples are documentaries 
made by Rifky Husain, Provokator Damai and 
Merah Saga, and one made by Victor Latupeirisa, 
Hiti-Hiti Hala-Hala – both Ambonese filmmakers. 
They portray the details of Christian-Muslim 
29 Soselisa (2007) wrote a Master’s thesis about women as 
peacebuilding agents.
30 Meinema’s (2012) thesis provides a thorough analysis 
on the role of youths in peacebuilding. 
31 Carita Orang Basudara, an edited volume by Manuputty, 
Salampessy, Ali-Fauzi, and Rafsadi (2014) provides 
many examples of interdependence-based activities at 
the functional-quotidian site.
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collaborations in post-conflict Maluku: how 
they started, why they were considered as 
necessary, the processes, the strategies to 
overcome challenges, and so on.
Meanwhile, one of the most influential 
books that have ever been written about the 
conflict and post-conflict circumstances in 
Maluku is Carita Orang Basudara. It consists of 
26 stories written by 25 Malukans – journalists, 
religious leaders, artists, activists, academicians, 
and politicians – reflecting upon Christian-
Muslim relations before, during, and after the 
conflict. On the one hand, the stories reveal 
things that are private and personal. On the 
other hand, they appeal to something familiar 
to Malukans, that is, collective memories and 
experiences surrounding the conflict.
What stands out from the above movies 
and book – as well as from many other books, 
songs, and poems written by Malukans in 
the last decade – is the shared message that 
returning to the basudara life is the way to 
move forward. Enthusiastically celebrating 
Christian-Muslim collaborations that fall under 
interdependence, none of them advocate for the 
truth and/or justice paths of reconciliation.32
What do we gain from identifying the 
four sites of interdependence? One thing 
is that it points at a gap in the literature, 
where there is a tendency to only locate 
reconciliation at the formal/national setting 
(i.e. Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa and National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Persons in Argentina) and 
or local/neighborhood setting (i.e. gacaca in 
Rwanda and nahe biti in Timor Leste).33 This 
probably relates significantly to the notion that 
reconciliation involves out-of-ordinary activities 
32 By contrast, two novels written by non-Malukans 
hint at the need for pursuing formal truth and justice 
procedures. They are Jalan Lain ke Tulehu, by Zen RS and 
Kei: Kutemukan Cinta di Tengah Perang, by Erni Aladjai. 
In separate interviews (2015), both writers confirm their 
pro-formal-truth-and-justice viewpoint.
33 See Olsen, Payne, & Reiter (2010), Popovski and Serrano 
(2012), and Skaar, Gloppen and Suhrke (2005).
that are specifically designed for reconciliatory 
purposes. In spite of this, as we have learned 
from the Maluku case, day-to-day activities and 
narratives about those activities (respectively, 
the functional-quotidian and narrative sites) 
are also instances of reconciliation.
In addition to that, close observations of 
each site reveal the mechanisms that underpin 
interdependence, which is the focus of the next 
section.
How Interdependence Works
Upon meticulous observation of the 
various activities at the aforementioned 
ceremonial, neighborhood, functional-
quotidian, and narrative sites, I suggest that 
interdependence functions through three 
mechanisms. First, it allows individuals to 
emphasize on their social roles rather than 
religious identity. It enables individuals to 
perform their roles as neighbors, mothers, 
youths, traders, customers, artists, doctors, 
journalists, bloggers, pela or gandong partners, 
members of the basudara community, and 
so on, rendering them opportunities not 
to identify themselves and be identified as 
Christians or Muslims at war. Such “identity 
change34” (Kelman, 2004) is easiest at the 
functional-quotidian site, relatively easy at 
the neighborhood site, plausible to portray 
at the narrative site, and most difficult at the 
ceremonial site. Undoubtedly, individuals 
enter the ceremonial site bearing the status 
as representatives of the Christian or Muslim 
community, which to a certain degree reasserts 
one’s religious affinity.
Second, interdependence provides space 
for individuals to display their apologies 
34 Following Herbert Kelman’s (2004) conceptualization 
of reconciliation as identity change, I suggest that 
individuals taking part in interdependence-based 
activities undergo a shift in their identity: from an 
identity of Christianity that is centered at the negation 
of Muslimhood and an identity of Muslimhood that is 
centered at the negation of Christianity, to an identity 
of Malukans.
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and forgiveness. In this case, participation in 
interdependence-based activities indicates a 
degree of remorse and willingness to forgive, 
as it is difficult to imagine that those who still 
hold animosities toward “the other” would 
participate in such activities. This indication 
is especially important given the “riot” and 
“mob violence” characteristic of the many 
communal clashes in Maluku, which makes 
it “next to impossible” to actually identify, 
reconnect with, and personally apologize to 
the very individuals whom one have hurt 
years ago. One respondent shared, ”Everyone 
knows [about my violent past]. It is important 
for me to take part in various Christian-Muslim 
activities to show everyone that I have changed, 
that I regretted what I did” (Interview, January 
2014). Another mentioned, “I knew the guys 
who destroyed my village. I understand that 
they did it because of ‘the heat of the moment’. 
They never verbally apologized, but I know 
they are sorry. Their active participation in the 
various interfaith programs says so” (Interview, 
August 2014).
Third, interdependence leads to the 
creation of focal points35 for peace. Everyone 
is expected to know what participation in 
interdependence-based activities means: it 
generates an understanding that “I know that 
you know that I am sorry” and “you know 
that I know that you are sorry.” This, in turn, 
fosters mutual security guarantees in the sense 
that everyone is confident that “the other side” 
is not interested in prolonging the violence. 
As illustrated by a respondent, “You are an 
outsider. What you see throughout this event 
are nice people coming together to celebrate 
peace. To us, it means more. We see former 
war commanders, former combatants, former 
enemies, and victims behaving as fellow 
citizens. By being here, each of us shows our 
commitment not to let that thing [communal 
35 By “focal point”, I refer to Thomas Schelling’s (1960: 57) 
idea of “each person’s expectation of what the others 
expect him to expect to be expected to do.”
violence] happen again. When they see us here, 
they become more confident in our commitment 
to peace. When we see them here, we become 
more confident in their commitment to peace” 
(Interview, January 2014).
The above mechanisms can be better 
understood by appreciating the performative 
aspects of interdependence. In other words, 
it is crucial to pay attention to the meanings 
that actors generate when they engage in 
this particular path of reconciliation. By 
openly taking part in formal Christian-Muslim 
meetings at the ceremonial site, in collective 
labor to repair houses, infrastructures, and 
places of worship, as well as in adat rituals 
at the neighborhood site, and in intergroup 
activities at the functional-quotidian site, an 
individual shows her willingness to distance 
herself from her religious identity and to 
redefine her social identities. She is, in a way, 
asking others to regard her and engage with 
her as a mother, a neighbor, a professional, 
etc. – not (merely) as a Christian or a Muslim. 
Her participation in the aforementioned 
interdependence-based activities also displays 
gestures of letting go of the violent past. Not 
only does she regret her and her coreligionists’ 
contributions to the past communal violence, 
she also absolves members of the other faith 
group from their wrongdoings. Furthermore, 
she understands that the thought processes 
behind her participation in interdependence-
based activities is understood and widely 
shared by others in her community. She 
knows that everyone knows that taking part 
in such activities signifies and strengthens 
commitments to peace.
Folding in Truth and Justice into 
Interdependence
As discussed throughout this paper, 
the interdependence path to reconciliation 
in Maluku is mostly driven by the pragmatic 
imperatives of restoring normalcy. By 
underlining Malukans’ strong desires for 
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normalcy, I do not mean to downplay the 
desires for truth and/or justice in Maluku. They, 
too, are robust. Nonetheless, the desires for 
normalcy and the desires for truth and justice 
seem to be at odds with each other. Truth and 
justice, together with amnesty and lustration, 
are paths of reconciliation that underline 
actors’ involvements in past acts of violence. 
For these paths to work – that is, to issue 
public records on past atrocities, retribution 
and restitution schemes, official pardons, and 
bans to enter political offices – it is necessary 
to accurately identify who the perpetrators 
and the victims are. Such “singling out” is seen 
as counterproductive to restoring normalcy 
through interdependence, which hinges on 
collectiveness and on willingness of parties to 
collaborate with each other.
Again, an emic approach is useful in 
understanding how Malukans settle tensions 
between the desire for normalcy and the desire 
for truth and justice. Since restoring normalcy 
was considered to be more pressing time-wise, 
the pursuit of truth was predominantly carried 
out at the macro (national-provincial) level and 
geared toward identifying the grand scenario 
of the Maluku conflict and the outside actors 
masterminding it, rather than singling out at 
the micro (community) level by identifying 
who did what to whom, where, when, and 
how. Similarly, the pursuit of justice was geared 
toward demanding that the masterminds of 
the conflict be held accountable, rather than 
settling among ordinary people on who pays 
what to whom, where, when, and how. In other 
words, as suggested by the data collected from 
interviews (mine and that of Ambon Database 
Pilot Study’s and Ambon Database’s36), focus 
group discussions, and participant observation, 
over time, Malukans have become less interested 
in knowing who exactly killed their family 
members, burned their house, harassed them 
36  Ambon Database Pilot Study and Ambon Database were 
put together by Samsu Rizal Panggabean and Ashutosh 
Varshney and funded by the Ford Foundation.
at checkpoints, etc. and are more interested 
in uncovering who among the military and 
civilian elites gave provokators the order to incite 
communal clashes in Maluku.
This is not to say that truth and justice 
paths of reconciliation are absent at the 
community level. As numerous interviews 
confirm, interdependence-based activities 
have elements of revealing the truth and 
observing justice. Upon developing a certain 
level of rapport, those taking part in these 
activities disclose their involvement in the 
conflict – perhaps not the entire story, but 
enough to demonstrate complicity. Each person 
understands that revealing some truth makes 
him/her vulnerable and this act of displaying 
vulnerability generates trust from others. Each 
person also knows that it is only fair that he/
she now carries a burden to help repair the 
damages brought about by the conflict as well 
as to ensure that no further communal violence 
takes place in Maluku.
In this case, truth is revealed in a limited 
manner and justice is observed in a future-
oriented manner. This means that accounts of 
one’s involvement in the conflict is only shared 
with a specific group of people with the specific 
purpose of gaining their trust. It also means that 
everyone knows that the way to absolve one’s 
contributions to the violent past is to embrace 
a collective responsibility to repair damages 
and prevent future violence. This is grounded 
in an understanding that strict adherence to 
legal justice would put everyone behind bars. 
Such observance of “limited truth” and “future 
oriented justice” is considered to be most suited 
to the need of restoring normalcy in Maluku. 
I suggest that the robustness of the 
desires for restoring normalcy over the desires 
for pursuing “blunt” truth and justice largely 
pertains to the vivid memories Malukans 
have of their pre-conflict life, which was 
laden with harmonious intergroup relations. 
In hundreds of interviews, both that of mine 
and those conducted for the Ambon Database 
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Pilot Study and Ambon Database, Malukans 
talked enthusiastically about celebrating 
Christmas and Idul Fitri with members of the 
other faith group, about how close they were 
with their childhood friends and colleagues 
despite their religious difference, and about 
how, historically, Christians and Muslims 
in Maluku are basudara. They see the 1999 
communal conflict as an exception, rather than 
the norm, to centuries of intergroup relations. 
This high regard toward memories of peace 
makes it costly for Christians and Muslims 
in Maluku to part ways, to pursue the truth 
and justice paths of reconciliation. Here, the 
Malukan experience stands out from similar 
cases of conflict such as in South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, and Northern Ireland, where violence 
and animosity had sustained over generations, 
hence blurring memories and repertoires of 
normalcy and of civilized relations between 
contending parties.
Concluding remarks
While being short of formal truth and 
justice procedures, the Malukan experience 
cannot be dismissed as a case in which 
reconciliation did not take place or did take 
place in a suboptimal manner. Reconciliation 
processes did happen in Maluku and are laden 
with lessons to learn from.
First, it establishes a strong case for taking 
an emic approach in studying reconciliation. It 
shows that when reconciliation is treated as 
vernacular practices, a handful of insights come 
to light: the various meanings of reconciliation, 
the shift of attitudes surrounding reconciliation, 
drivers of reconciliation, practices that would 
traditionally not be considered as reconciliation, 
etc. This paper has certainly not done any justice 
in fully presenting the richness of meanings and 
practices of rekonsiliasi in Maluku. 
Second, it elucidates a less known path 
to reconciliation: interdependence. It brings 
attention to the four sites of interdependence, 
teases out how interdependence works, 
and underlines its performative aspects. In 
short, it proves that interdependence works. 
Nevertheless, more research needs to be 
conducted to identify the conditions under 
which interdependence work – does it work in 
settings other than communal violence, does it 
work when conflict is widespread throughout 
the country, does it work when one party to the 
conflict is seen as “migrants”, and so on.
Third, it shows that the adoption of 
interdependence does not abandon truth and 
justice altogether. It uncovers how subjects 
settle the tension between the pragmatic need 
for normalcy and the moral imperatives of 
truth and justice, preventing us from taking 
a “black-and-white”, “either-or” approach to 
the dilemma.
Lastly, the case of Maluku shows that, 
when selected by subjects themselves based 
on their understanding of the post-conflict 
situation they are in, interdependence can be 
as viable as truth commissions and trials in 
bringing about reconciliation.
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